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DEFENDING LITIGATION AGAINST A FOREIGN




FOREIGN AIR carriers are finding themselves increas-
ingly subject to jurisdiction in United States courts
without regard to traditional state requirements for per-
sonal jurisdiction such as doing business within a forum
or other long-arm statute requirements.' The passage of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA" or "Act")
in 1976 2 has conferred certain benefits upon airlines that
are owned by foreign governments but operated in a com-
mercial capacity. A foreign government owned corpora-
tion that operates in a commercial capacity is subject to
suit in much the same manner as any other citizen, and, in
many respects, may be at a distinct disadvantage when the
FSIA is applied. This article will provide an overview of
some of the provisions of the FSIA and discuss issues that
ought to be considered by counsel defending a foreign
government owned airline in an action brought in the
United States.
II FSIA IN GENERAL
The underlying theory of the common law doctrine of
* Associate with the New York City law firm of Condon & Forsyth, specializing
in aviation litigation; B.A. 1976, J.D. 1979 University of Louisville.
I See infra notes 70-118 and accompanying text.
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611
(1982).
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sovereign immunity is that equals may not exercise con-
trol over each other. The resulting rule prohibits an
American court of law in many circumstances from exer-
cising jurisdiction over and rendering a judgment against
a foreign sovereign. Congress enacted the FSIA as a reac-
tion to the perceived need to reaffirm the jurisdiction of
United States courts in actions against foreign states, to
delineate the circumstances in which foreign states are im-
mune from suit and to define those circumstances in
which the property of a foreign government is immune
from execution of judgment.4 The stated purpose of the
FSIA is to define the terms and conditions under which
actions can be maintained against a foreign state or its en-
tities in the courts of the United States and to set forth
when a foreign state may properly invoke sovereign
immunity.5
Before adoption of the FSIA, the executive branch of
the United States government, acting through the State
Department, intervened in disputes between United
States citizens and foreign states and determined to a
large extent whether United States courts should adjudi-
cate particular claims against foreign states.6 At least
since 1952, a limited view of sovereign immunity had
been adopted by the State Department pursuant to an in-
terdepartmental letter known as the Tate Letter.7 That
document announced the policy that a foreign sovereign
government could be held responsible in a United States
court in a dispute arising out of its commercial or private
- Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States - A Proposal for Reform of United States
Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 930 & n.8 (1969). See The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (foreign sovereign immunity granted as
matter of grace and comity on part of the United States).
4 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6604.
s Id. at 6.
6 See Note, Sovereign Immunity - Limits of Judicial Control - The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 431-32, 435 (1977).
7 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General of the United States (May 19, 1952),
reprinted in 26 DEPT. ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter cited as "Tate Letter"].
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acts, but not out of its public or sovereign acts.8 Under
the guidelines of the Tate Letter, a plaintiff wishing to sue
a foreign sovereign had to establish to the satisfaction of
the State Department that the "exercise of jurisdiction
was prudent in light of diplomatic considerations." 9 The
FSIA eliminated this role of the State Department and
the Act is intended to ensure that the restrictive view of
sovereign immunity can be applied consistently without
diplomatic pressure.' 0
A. Definition of "Foreign State"
In order to determine whether the FSIA applies, coun-
sel for a foreign airline should ascertain whether the client
qualifies as a "foreign state." Section 1603(a) of the FSIA
defines the term "foreign state" to include all levels, sub-
divisions, agencies, and instrumentalities of government
within a foreign state."l As defined by the FSIA, an instru-
mentality of a foreign state includes an airline owned by a
foreign government or operated as a department or divi-
sion thereof.' 2  If a foreign state or instrumentality
* Id. at 984-85.
* Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 474, 478
(1980). See Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Cuidad de la
Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964).
10 "A principal purpose of this bill [FSIA] is to transfer the determination of
sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby re-
ducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring
litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and
under procedures that insure due process." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at
17.
I Section 1603(b) of the FSIA defines an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state as any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2)
which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned
by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is
neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
" See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 6, 16.
As a general matter, entities which meet the definition of an "agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state" could assume a variety of
forms, including a state trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a
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thereof owns the majority of shares or other ownership
interest of an airline, or if an airline is created as an organ
of a foreign state or political subdivision, it will qualify as
an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" for pur-
poses of the FSIA.13
B. Express and Implied Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Section 1330(a) of the FSIA provides the sole basis for
federal jurisdiction in an action against a foreign sover-
eign or its instrumentality. 14 Under section 1330, a find-
transport organization such as a shipping line or airline, a steel com-
pany, a central bank, an export association, a governmental procure-
ment agency or a department or ministry which acts and is suable in
its own name."
Id. (emphasis added).
The hearings before the Subcommittee on Claims and Governmental Relations
of the House Committee on the Judiciary refer specifically to the applicability of
the FSIA to a government-controlled airline:
MR. DANIELSON. Could you give an example of an activity by a
foreign government corporation, such as you have just been talking
about here, like a government-controlled airline, and under what
ciricumstances could his conduct be regarded as a public function
rather than a commercial function, for us to invoke an immunity?
Can you give me one of those? The other side of the coin?
MR. BROWER. That is pretty difficult for me to conceive of in the
case of an airline, which, fully owned by a foreign government, is
fundamentally, if not wholly, in the business of transporting air pas-
sengers for commercial affairs ...
Immunities of Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before Subcomm. on Claims and Gov-
ernmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as "1973 Hearings"] (testimony of Charles N. Brower, Legal
Adviser, Dep't of State).
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b), supra note 11. See also Keller v. Transportes Aereos
Militares Ecuadorianos, 601 F.2d 787,788 (D.D.C. 1985) (where T.A.M.E., cre-
ated as a department of the Ecuadorian Air Force and therefore a foreign State for
FSIA purposes under § 1603(a),(b), owned the majority of shares of T.A.M.E.,
C.A., T.A.M.E., C.A. was an instrumenality of a foreign state under § 1603(b)(2)
and thus a foreign state under § 1603(a)).
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982). In McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722
F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1983), diversity of citizenship was alleged as the basis of
jurisdiction for an action against the defendant government of Iran, but the court
rejected diversity in favor of the FSIA as the basis for any jurisdiction in personam
that might exist: "section 1332 [the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction] no
longer provides for district court jurisdiction over a foreign state defendant, and
• .. if appellants are to obtain jurisdiction in this case over Iran, it must be
through the FSIA". See also Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors 761 F.2d 1527,
1531-32 (11 th Cir. 1985); Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417,
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ing of subject matter jurisdiction hinges on whether the
court finds that the foreign state is not entitled to assert
immunity pursuant to sections 1605 through 1607 or any
applicable international agreement.' 5 Absent an excep-
tion to immunity, the FSIA immunizes foreign sovereigns
from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts.1 6 Per-
sonal jurisdiction, in turn, hinges on the existence of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and proper service of process.' 7
A foreign sovereign is not entitled to assert immunity if
it has expressly waived immunity or has impliedly waived
immunity by engaging in functions in a non-governmental
capacity.' 8 Section 1605(a)(1) provides for an express
waiver of immunity. All foreign air carriers operating in
the United States must first obtain a foreign air carrier
permit or exemption from the Department of Transporta-
tion pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 195819 and
421-22 (5th Cir. 1982); Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d 1151, 1153
(4th Cir. 1982); Rex v. CIA. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 63-65 (3d Cir.
1981); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 878-81 (4th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A.,
639 F.2d 872, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1981).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982).
is 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). Section 1604 states that "a foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States
except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter." Id.
17 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982).
i8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1982). Section 1605(a) sets forth the instances when
a foreign state is not entitled to immunity in United States courts by express or
implied waiver:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case -
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explic-
itly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
which the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance
with the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act per-
formed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the for-
eign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States; ....
Id.
,9 Foreign air carrier permits were formerly issued by the Civil Aeronautics
Board pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1371, but with the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset
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the orders, rules and regulations promulgated thereun-
der. As a condition to obtaining such a permit,20 the for-
eign air carrier must waive all rights to assert any defense
of sovereign immunity in actions arising from the carrier's
operations pursuant to the permit.2' If a cause of action
arises out of the airline's commercial operations in the
United States pursuant to its permit, the express waiver of
sovereign immunity in the permit should be controlling.2 2
Accordingly, no consideration of implied waiver under
section 1605(a) should be necessary under those circum-
stances. As a practical matter, however, the defense of
sovereign immunity should be pleaded as an affirmative
defense or a foreign state may be precluded from later
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1703, Con-
gress transferred this function to the Department of Transportation, which now
issues foreign air carrier permits through its Office of Aviation Operations, Li-
censing Division.
20 See, e.g., express waiver language in Aeromexico foreign air carrier permit,
infra note 21.
21 See, e.g., Application of Aeronaves De Mexico, S.A., 76 C.A.B. 1034, 1037
(1978) (Order 78-5-184) which provides as follows:
By accepting this permit, as amended, the holder waives any right it
may possess to assert any defense of sovereign immunity from suit in
any action or proceeding instituted against the holder in any court
or other tribunal in the United States (or its territories or posses-
sions) based upon any claim arising out of operations by the holder
under this permit, as amended.
On January 21, 1986, the Department of Transportation issued a proposed or-
der that would require all foreign air carriers to waive sovereign immunity in any
action arising out of their operations regardless of whether the operations are
pursuant to the permit or exemption. See Department of Transportation Order
No. 86-1-38. In its current form, the Order purports to be retroactive. If the
operating permit or exemption is amended in accordance with this Order, foreign
air carriers will be deprived of their sovereign immunity and subject matter juris-
diction defenses in all actions regardless of whether there is any nexus between
the gravamen of the complaint and the carriers' operations in the United States.
Since subject matter jurisdiction coupled with proper service of process under
§ 1608 of the FSIA form the basis of personal jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign, this Order effectively deprives a foreign airline of all FSIA jurisdictional de-
fenses unless relief is available pursuant to Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention.
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), supra note 18. The United States Supreme Court
in Verlinden declined to decide whether, in an express waiver situation, a foreign
sovereign also consents to suit based on activities wholly unrelated to the United
States. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 490 n.15. However, due process considerations
should require that there be some nexus between the claim and the carrier's oper-
ations pursuant to the permit. See infra notes 70-118 and accompanying text.
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moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.23
The FSIA section which has proved most troublesome
for the courts is the implied waiver embodied in section
1605(a) (2), which provides that a foreign state has no ju-
risdictional immunity in an action based upon "a commer-
cial activity carried on in the United States" or upon an
act "performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere," or
upon a commercial act committed outside of the United
States which causes a direct effect in the United States.24
In a situation where the cause of action, either in tort or
in contract, arises out of acts or omissions performed by
the foreign carrier in the United States in connection with
its sale of tickets, or operation of ticket offices, flights, or
airport facilities, there is little question that the cause of
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States. Such activity is subject to the express
waiver of sovereign immunity from actions related to op-
erations conducted pursuant to a foreign air carrier per-
mit. However, the three exceptions to immunity
contained in section 1605(a)(2) must be interpreted in
conjunction with section 1603(d) which defines "commer-
cial activity" as either "a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." 25
Section 1603(e) defines "commercial activity carried on in
the United States by a foreign state" as commercial activ-
23 Although it is questionable whether lack of subject matter jurisdiction can
ever be waived by failure to plead the defense, the legislative history of FSIA indi-
cates that "[an implicit waiver would ... include a situation where a foreign state
has filed a responsive pleading in an action without raising the defense of sover-
eign immunity" (H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6617), and that sovereign immunity is an "affirmative de-
fense which must be specifically pleaded" for a court to consider it. Id. at 6616.
In Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 727 F.2d
274 (2d Cir. 1984), the court stated in dicta that the FSIA bars a subsequent asser-
tion of the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction if it has not been raised in
the first responsive pleading. Id. at 278. Accord Aboujdid v. Singapore Airlines,
108 A.D.2d 330, 489 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173-74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
24 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), supra, note 18.
'- 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982).
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ity "having substantial contact with the United States."126
The first section 1605(a)(2) exception to immunity -
commercial activity carried on in the United States - ap-
plies only if there exists a substantial nexus between the
United States and the commercial activity out of which the
cause of action arises. 7 Unfortunately, though, the few
decisions that have interpreted the immunity provisions
of the FSIA and applied them to foreign airlines have
done so in an inconsistent manner. In Sugarman v. Aer-
omexico, Inc. 28 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that Aeromexico, an airline wholly
owned by the Republic of Mexico, was not immune from
suit under the facts of the case because the plaintiffs
claim was embraced by the exception to immunity for
commercial activity carried on within the United States.29
The plaintiffs claims of inconvenience and injury caused
by the delay of a return flight from Acapulco to the United
States were held to be based upon commercial activity
carried on in the United States.30 Significantly, the delay
itself occurred in Acapulco, not in the United States.
The Sugarman decision provides questionable help in
guiding defense counsel through the maze of FSIA provi-
sions. Arguably, the court did not need to discuss which
section 1605(a)(2) exception to sovereign immunity ap-
plied. Presumably, the Mexican airline expressly waived
sovereign immunity with respect to operations to the
United States when it obtained a foreign air carrier per-
26 Id
27 See Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Alger-
ienne de Navigacion, 730 F.2d 195, 199-204 (5th Cir. 1984) for an extensive dis-
cussion of the requirement of a nexus between tortious claims and the commercial
activity carried on in the United States. Accord In re Disaster of Riyadh Airport, 16
Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,880 (D.D.C. 1981) (no connection between Saudi Arabian Air-
lines' business activities in the United States and the crash of a Saudi Arabian
Aircraft on a flight between Riyadh and Jeddah).
28 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
2 Id. at 273.
10 Id. at 272-73. In concluding that defendant Aeromexico had carried on com-
mercial activity in the United States, the court considered the destination of the
flight (New York City) and the purchase of tickets in New Jersey by the plaintiff.
Id.
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mit.3 l Because the plaintiff had purchased a round-trip
ticket in New Jersey, his contract cause of action probably
arose out of the operations of the airline pursuant to its
foreign air carrier permit.3 2 However, the interpretation
of section 1605(a)(2) in Sugarman is at odds with Chief
Judge Weinstein's interpretation of the same clause in
Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 33 a case which held that
under the commercial activity exception to sovereign im-
munity, the action must be based upon the specific com-
mercial activity carried on in the United States and not
simply any general commercial activity of the foreign
state.3 4
Following Sugarman, few decisions involving actions
against foreign airlines have discussed the express waiver
in the foreign air carrier permit, but have instead looked
to the implied waiver provisions that deal with commer-
cial activity. In Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp.35 the
plaintiffs filed a suit for false imprisonment and battery
against several defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that
they had been forcibly placed on board a Dominicana
flight from Santo Domingo to San Juan by Dominican im-
migration officers, with the aid of the airline's employ-
ees.3 6  Dominicana, an airline wholly owned by the
Dominican Republic and qualifying as a "foreign state"
pursuant to section 1603, claimed immunity from the ju-
risdiction of the court under the provisions of sections
31 See Application of Aeronaves De Mexico, supra note 21.
3 Critics of this decision who have omitted in their analysis of Sugarman any
discussion of the express waiver contained in Aeromexico's foreign air carrier per-
mit have compounded the confusion generated by this decision. See Cook, Count-
ing the Dragon's Teeth: Foreign Sovereign Immunity and its Impact on International Aviation
Litigation, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 687, 723-24 (1981) for its criticism of Sugarman
because of its deviation from interpretation of the same FSIA provision in Harris
and also advocating that the third exception to immunity ("direct effect" clause)
should have been controlling instead.
3 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
14 Id. at 1062.
- 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
I ld. at 1373. The plaintiffs' names apparently appeared on an official list of
undesirable aliens. Id.
1986] 469
470 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
1604 through 1607 and moved to dismiss the action.3 7
Dominicana argued that the alleged injuries were caused
by the official acts of Dominican immigration authorities,
which acts were insulated from judicial scrutiny in United
States courts by the "act of state" doctrine. 8
The district court granted Dominicana's motion to dis-
miss without specifying the grounds for dismissal 9.3  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed and remanded, however, focusing on the implied
waiver of immunity provisions in section 1605(a)(2) of the
FSIA. The issue for the court was whether the particular
conduct that gave rise to plaintiffs' claims was related to
the commercial activitiy of the airline in the United
States.40 With respect to the Plaintiffs' claims of involun-
tary rerouting, the court held that the airline's actions in
transporting plaintiffs out of the Dominican Republic
were not commercial but were pursuant to the direction
of the immigration officials. 4' On the other hand, plain-
tiffs' claims for breach of warranty and contract based on
non-performance of the vacation tour arose out of
Dominicana's marketing, sale of airline tickets, and com-
mercial activity in the United States.42 Consequently, the
court held, without discussing the applicability of the for-
eign air carrier permit express waiver of immunity, that
the plaintiffs did state breach of contract and negligence
claims based upon the commercial activity of the airline in
the United States and came, therefore, within the excep-
tions to immunity under FSIA. 3 Upon subsequent trial of
31 Id. at 1374. Dominicana moved to dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
(6). Id.
.18 Id. Dominicana urged the operation of the act of state doctrine in support of
its 12(b)(6) motion. Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1378-79.
4, Id. at 1379. Acting merely as an arm or agent of the Dominican government,
the airline was entitled to government function immunity, the court held. Id.
42 Id. at 1379-80.
4- Id. at 1380-81. The Court would probably have reached the same conclusion
had its analysis included consideration of Dominicana's express waiver of immu-
nity in its foreign air carrier permit. The express waiver would only apply to
claims arising from Dominicana's operations pursuant to the permit, i.e., commer-
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the action without jury, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida rendered judgment in
favor of Dominicana on the grounds that the airline did
not breach its contract of carriage with the Arangos. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed that plaintiffs had no cause of action against
Dominicana.44
An even broader interpretation of the exceptions to im-
munity can be found in Aboujdid v. Singapore Airlines.45 In
that case, the lower court denied the foreign airlines' mo-
tions to dismiss.46 The court held that sovereign immunity
did not apply to commercial transactions, even though the
alleged negligent acts of the defendant airlines occurred
outside of the United States without causing any direct ef-
fect in the United States other than causing injury to
United States citizens travelling abroad.4 7 The plaintiffs
were passengers on an Air France flight scheduled to fly
from Athens, Greece to Paris, France. The flight
originated in Tel Aviv but was hijacked by terrorists who
diverted the aircraft to Entebbe, Uganda.48 It is signifi-
cant that there existed no privity49 or other connection
between the plaintiffs, who were Air France passengers,
and the defendant airlines.50
Nevertheless, plaintiffs alleged that Gulf Air and Singa-
pore Airlines, which had transported the terrorists to Ath-
ens, negligently failed to inspect passenger luggage
cial activity in the United States including marketing and sale of tickets and vaca-
tion package tours and operations of flights to and from the United States.
44 191 N.Y.L.J. 112 at 12, col. 1, modified 108 A.D.2d 330, 489 N.Y.S. 2d 171
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
45 761 F.2d 1527 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
46 Aboujdid v. Singapore Airlines, 191 N.Y.LJ. 112 at 12, col. 3.
47 Id. at 12, col. 2.
48 Id. at 23, col. 1
41 Id. The existence of privity between a claimant and a defendant airline is
important because it might give rise to a breach of contract claim. Such a claim
would arguably bring the action within the ambit of the express waiver of immu-
nity contained in the airlines' foreign air carrier permit if operations to and from
the United States were involved. See supra note 21.
-Aboujdid, 19 N.Y.LJ. 112 at 12, col. 1.
1986]
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before permitting the terrorists to board the aircraft."
Unlike Sugarman and Arango, the Aboujdid plaintiffs had no
cause of action for breach of contract against Gulf Air and
Singapore Airlines because there had been no contract of
carriage between them. 2 The lower court acknowledged
that both Gulf Air and Singapore Airlines were "foreign
states", but held without further explanation that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity did not apply to commercial
transactions, regardless of whether the alleged negligence
had any nexus with commercial activity of the airlines con-
ducted in the United States.5 The airlines' commercial
activities in the United States at the time of the lawsuit
were deemed sufficient to preclude the invocation of im-
munity. 4 Such ruling, however, arguably contravened
the FSIA implied waiver provisions. Section 1605(a)(2)
makes a condition of subject matter jurisdiction based on
commercial activity within the United States that the cause
of action be based on that activity. On appeal, the New
York Appellate Division modified the decision to dismiss
the complaint as to defendant Singapore Airlines, but af-
firmed with respect to defendant Gulf Air on the grounds
that the defense of sovereign immunity, and hence, sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, was implicitly waived when Gulf
Air did not plead it as an affirmative defense in its an-
swer.5 6 As support, the court cited to dicta in Canadian
5 Id.
I2 d.
5 Id. at 12, col. 2. But see Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed, 455 U.S. 929 (1982). In Velidor, the court stated that the
"mere pursuit of commercial activity affecting the United States does not fully
satisfy § 1605(a)(2).... It is essential that there be a nexus between the plaintiff's
grievance and the sovereign's commercial activity." Id. at 820. See also Vencedora
Oceanica Navigacion v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigacion, 730
F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1984).
54 Aboujdid, 191 N.Y.LJ. 112 at 12, col. 3.
- See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), supra note 18. Although the court did not discuss
it, the express waiver provision in the foreign air carrier permit was not relevant
since the plaintiffs' claims did not arise out of the airlines' operations to and from
the United States.
- Aboujdid, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 173-74. Since Singapore had preserved its defense
of sovereign immunity, the court dismissed it from the action after finding that
neither the nexus between the incident and the defendants' commercial activity
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A..57
The appellate court held in Aboujdid that there existed
no basis for a finding of jurisdiction under the third ex-
ception to immunity.5 8 The defendants' acts or omissions
with respect to the terrorists did not have a "direct effect"
in the United States within the meaning of section 1605(a)
(2) .59
Although the courts in Sugarman, Arango, and Aboujdid
each found an exception to immunity, the significant dif-
ferences among the three cases lie in the fact that the
plaintiffs in Sugarman and Arango were in privity with the
airlines and had purchased their airline tickets in the
United States. At least with respect to their causes of ac-
tion sounding in contract, their complaint arguably arose
out of the airlines' commercial activity in the United
States. The plaintiffs in Aboujdid, however, had no con-
nection with the airlines against which they asserted a
cause of action based solely on negligence.
In Close v. American Airlines, Inc.,6° the court correctly
held that personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in
Kingston, Jamaica from the jet-wash of a nearby aircraft
did not cause a "direct effect" in the United States. 6' The
plaintiff was not a passenger of the airline whose plane
within the United States nor the effect in the United States of Singapore's negli-
gent conduct in Bahrain was sufficient to give rise to an FSIA exception to immu-
nity. Id. at 174.
57 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984).
- Aboujdid, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
so Id. A jurisdictional direct effect in the United States of foreign sovereign
commercial actitivity conducted abroad (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), supra note 18)
requires a greater impact in the United States than an American tourist being
injured abroad. Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1064-65
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). Accord Australian Government Aircraft Factories v. Lynne, 743
F.2d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S -, 105 S.Ct. 1189 (1985);
Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 510 (1984); Tigchon v. Island of Jamaica, 591 F. Supp. 765,
767 (W.D. Mich. 1984). See Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266
(D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (injury to American citi-
zen abroad insufficient to support in personam jurisdiction under District of Colum-
bia long-arm statutue after which FSIA was patterned).
- 587 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
61 Id. at 1063-66.
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injured her with its jet-wash, and her complaint against
that company was based solely on negligence principles.62
Causing injury to American citizens abroad, the court de-
cided, does not satisfy the requirements of the "direct ef-
fect" exception to sovereign immunity.6"
Notwithstanding the inconsistent interpretations and
analyses of section 1605 implied waivers of immunity with
respect to actions involving foreign air carriers, it is clear
that an airline qualifying as a "foreign state" is not enti-
tled to sovereign immunity, but is instead subject to the
jurisdiction of American courts when a plaintiffs claims
arise out of the carrier's commercial operations in the
United States or its operations pursuant to a foreign air
carrier permit. Upon determination that no immunity ex-
ists, a United States District Court has original jurisdiction
over any civil action against the foreign air carrier without
regard to the amount in controversy, assuming that ser-
vice of process 64 is made in accordance with FSIA.
C. Sovereign Immunity as an Affirmative Defense
Before the enactment of FSIA, if a person named a for-
eign sovereign as a defendant in a lawsuit there existed
some authority that required the plaintiff to allege and
prove the sovereign's consent to be sued.65 Congress in-
tended, and cases pursuant to FSIA have held, that sover-
eign immunity from suit is in the nature of an affirmative
defense.66 If the defense is not pleaded in the first re-
21 Id. at 1063.
w. Id. at 1063-66.
-' For a discussion of service of process under the FSIA, see infra notes 138-141
and accompanying text.
w, Puente v. Spanish Nat. State, 116 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 627 (1941); Landley v. Republic of Panama, 31 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1940).
- H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 17. See Aboujdid v. Singapore Airlines,
Ltd., 489 N.Y.S. 2d at 173-74. Because subject matter jurisdiction hinges on the
existence of an exception to foreign sovereign immunity under § 1330(a), the
United States Supreme Court has stated that even if the foreign state does not
enter an appearance to assert an immunity defense, a federal district court must
still determine whether immunity is available. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1983).
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sponsive pleading, the court may deem the defense of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction waived,67 particularly when
an instrumentality or agency of a foreign sovereign is
sued rather than the sovereign itself. The defendant
bears the ultimate burden of proving its entitlement to
immunity as a foreign state or instrumentality.68 Once the
defendant provides evidence of immunity, however, the
plaintiff must rebut by offering evidence that one of the
statutory exceptions in section 1605(a) applies and sup-
port the relevant exception by affidavit or other proof.69
III PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
A. Jurisdiction
Many courts have held that the FSIA broadens the ap-
plication of personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign
beyond the traditional notions of personal jurisdiction ex-
ercised with respect to private individuals and corpora-
tions. In effect, some courts have held that if a foreign
sovereign is subject to personal jurisdiction in any state, it
is subject to jurisdiction in every state. State long-arm
statutes may, therefore, no longer be relevant in determ-
ing whether a foreign air carrier is subject to in personam
jurisdiction in a particular state. The practical effect of
many court decisions is to turn the FSIA into a federal
long-arm statute.
The FSIA provisions that govern exceptions to immu-
nity and service of process are interrelated with concepts
of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. If
67 See Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania De Acero Del Pacifico S.A.,
727 F.2d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 1984). See Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v.
Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1964) for a dis-
cussion of waiver of sovereign immunity by a general appearance prior to enact-
ment of the FSIA.
- Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Came, 705 F.2d 250, 253-54 (7th Cir.
1983); Jet Line Services, Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1171
(D.Md. 1978). See also Matter of Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D. Tex.
1982); De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900, 903 (E.D.
La. 1981).
f9 Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Came, 705 F.2d at 256.
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it is established in an action governed by the FSIA that a
foreign state is not entitled to sovereign immunity, the
United States District Court automatically has subject
matter jurisdiction over the proceedings.7 0 If subject mat-
terjurisdiction exists and proper service of process upon
the foreign state has been made under section 1608(b), 7'
the United States District Court may exercise statutory
personal jurisdiction over the foreign state,72 subject to
due process requirements.
Although application of the federal long-arm statute
embodied in the FSIA obviates the application of the fo-
rum state's jurisdictional statutes, courts have held and
Congress has recognized that the constitutional limita-
tions on a court's power to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a particular defendant must be observed. 73 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,74
interpreted the FSIA and its legislative history to require a
due process analysis of the court's power that examines
the contacts of a foreign state with the entire United
States rather than the contacts with the forum state.75 A
review of the facts and analysis of Texas Trading will high-
light the important distinctions in a due process scrutiny
under FSIA as compared with that involving an action
against a private citizen or corporation.
Texas Trading arose out of a breach of several contracts
by the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its Central Bank.76
70 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 138-141 and accompanying text for a discussion of service of
process under the FSIA.
72 Section 1330(b) states that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over foreign state shall
exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction
under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this ti-
tle." 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (b) (1982).
7.1 See comments concerning section 1330(b) in H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note
4, at 13.
7. 647 F.2d 300 (2d. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
75 Id. at 308-10.
M Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 302-06. The decision of the United States
Supreme Court on the constitutionality of an action by a foreign plaintiff against a
foreign sovereign under the FSIA - Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
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Nigeria had executed 109 contracts with sixty-eight sup-
pliers to buy sixteen million metric tons of cement at a
price of nearly one billion dollars. 7 A backlog of ships
waiting to unload in Nigerian harbors developed, with
more cement-loaded vessels arriving at Nigerian ports
daily. 78 Nigeria repudiated the contracts because it was
unable to accept delivery.79 When four suppliers brought
actions in the Southern District of New York against the
Republic of Nigeria, the Nigerian government invoked the
defense of sovereign immunity under the FSIA. 80 The
district court dismissed some of the actions for lack ofju-
risdiction,8 ' but on appeal the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that personal and
subject matter jurisdiction existed under the FSIA and
that the Republic of Nigeria had sufficient minimum con-
tacts with the United States for constitutional constraints
to be satisfied.82 The Court of Appeals addressed the
availability of sovereign immunity as a defense, the pres-
ence of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs'
claims, and the propriety of personal jurisdiction over the
defendants. The court first established that Nigeria was
acting in a commercial capacity and that sovereign immu-
nity was not a defense.8 3 Then the court looked to the
constitutional constraints 84 on exercising statutory per-
461 U.S. 480 (1982) - also arose out of the breach of a similar contract between a
Dutch corporation and the Republic of Nigeria.
77 Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 303.
78 Id. at 305.
79 Id. at 305-06.
8o Id. at 306.
8, Id. at 306. The district court held that where all contract negotiations were
conducted outside of the United States, the contracts were governed by Nigerian
law, and the only effect in the United States was that letters of credit were payable
to New York plaintiffs though a New York bank, insufficient direct effects existed
in the United States to support jurisdiction under the FSIA. 500 F. Supp. 320,
325-27.
82 647 F.2d at 314-15.
83 Id. at 310.
8 Since the passage of the FSIA, courts interpreting the Act have applied a due
process minimum contacts analysis. See Maritime International Nominees Estab-
lishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 71 (1983); Gemini Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Organiza-
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sonaijurisidiction over the defendants.85 When analyzing
the defendants' relevant contacts in order to satisfy due
process requirements, the court determined that it must
first decide whose contacts were relevant.8 6 The court
that found the Central Bank of Nigeria's commercial con-
tacts and activities were chargeable to Nigeria and that the
contacts of the New York correspondent bank, Morgan
Guaranty Trust, were chargeable to the Republic of Nige-
ria and the Central Bank of Nigeria. 7
The second aspect of the constitutional inquiry involves
determination of the relevant geographical area for pur-
poses of delineating the minimum contacts necessary for
in personam jurisdiction. Significantly, the Texas Trading
court wrote that the area with which the defendants must
have had minimum contacts was the entire United States,
not merely the State of New York where the action was
pending. 88 Application of Texas Trading has an adverse
tion for Chemicals and Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981); Thomas P. Gon-
zales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Producion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th
Cir. 1980); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979); Decor by
Nikkei International, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), afld, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. II1. 1980); Harris v. VAO In-
tourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
s- Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 313-15.
so Id. at 314.
87 Id. Actions in the forum by an agent on the defendant's behalf can support
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d
673, 676, n.7 (2d Cir. 1979); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116,
120-121 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968); Bankers Trust Co. v.
Worldwide Transporation Services, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1101 (E.D. Ark. 1982); East
Europe Domestic International Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 390
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aFd mem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979); Frummer v. Hilton Ho-
tels International, Inc., 19 N.Y. 2d 533, 227 N.E. 2d 851, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923
(1967).
8 Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314. In reaching this decision, the court of appeals
compared the FSIA service of process provision with service of process provisions
for antitrust and securities laws. "Since service was made under § 1608, the rele-
vant area in delineating contacts is the entire United States, not merely New York.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (service of process provision for FSIA) with 15 U.S.C.
§§ 21(f) (service of process provision for antitrust laws), 77 V (same for securities
laws)." Id. See also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 519 F.2d 974, 998-1000 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143
(2d Cir. 1974); Leasco Data Processing Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d
Cir. 1972).
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impact on foreign air carriers that fly into the United
States. In any action against a foreign air carrier arising
out of a contract of carriage where the United States is a
stopping place, point of departure, or point of destina-
tion, there will always be some contact with the United
States. Whether it would be a "minimum contact" suffi-
cient for due process purposes is another question. Ac-
cording to the Texas Trading analysis, if the contact is
sufficient, the air carrier may be subject to suit in every
state of the union without regard to contacts with the fo-
rum state, subject to any venue constraints. In Texas Trad-
ing, the defendant foreign state and its agents were found
to have "repeatedly and purposefully" availed themselves
of the privilege of conducting business in the United
States and to have invoked the benefits and protections of
American laws.89 When this occurred, the foreign state
had every "reason to expect to be haled before a . . .
court" in the United States. 90The contacts of both the Nigerian government and the
Central Bank with the United States were in New York,
the forum state.91 Accordingly, the Texas Trading court did
not have to address a situation where, although it con-
ducted some business in the United States, the defendant
was sued in a state where it did not conduct any business.
Nevertheless, this expansive interpretation of "forum" for
the "minimum contacts" test by the court of appeals has
subsequently been followed in cases where there were no
relevant contacts with the forum state.
In Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television,92
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit stated in dicta that the defendant's contacts with the
State of New York, not the forum state of Florida, were
determinative in applying the constitutional due process
so Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251
(1958) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
o Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 315 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216
(1977)).
91 Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314-15.
02 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982).
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analysis.93 Citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson94
and Texas Trading, the court held that the contacts of the
foreign state with New York were sufficient "minimum
contacts" with the entire United States to satisfy due pro-
cess constraints.95
A district court in Arkansas has also employed this
analyis to evaluate the propriety of exercising jurisdiction
over an agency of the Mexican government. In Bankers
Trust Co. v. Worldwide Transportation Services, Inc. ,96 due pro-
cess requirements were satisfied by the foreign agency's
extensive economic activity in the United States when it
repeatedly and purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting business in this country.97 Consistent with
the interpretation of Texas Trading, the court held that na-
tional rather than forum state contacts are determinative
in any due process minimum contacts analysis under the
I ld. at 1352-53.
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d at 1349-53.
Cf Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, - U.S -, 104 S. Ct. 1868,
1874 (1984) (defendant's purchases in the state of Texas and other isolated con-
tacts unrelated to the cause of action did not satisfy the due process requirements
of continuous and systematic contacts necessary to support a finding of general
jurisdiction over the defendant).
w, 537 F. Supp. 1101 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
97 Id. at 1110-11. In Bankers Trust, a Mexican government agency engaged in
purchasing agricultural products from American companies had hired an Ameri-
can agent to coordinate the transportation of the goods from points of origin
within the United States to Mexico. Id. at 1103-09. The Mexican agency also
engaged Bankers Trust Company of New York as a financial agent in paying for
the services of the transportation agent. Id. The district court ruled that such
activity was sufficient commercial activity within the United States to support sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Id. at 1107-09. With subject matter juris-
diction established, the court turned to a four part analysis of "traditional due
process considerations" necessary for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1110. In the
first step of its analysis, the court wrote that the facts of the case clearly estab-
lished that the Mexican agency "repeatedly and purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities" in the United States. Id. Secondly, the court
stated, the extensiveness of commercial activity in the United States satisfied the
Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) requirement that the Mexican agency
have reason to expect to be haled before an American court. Thirdly, the court
continued, litigation in an American court was not "unduly inconvenient." Id at
1111. In the final component of its due process analysis, the court found in the
legislative history of the FSIA and in judicial precedent a manifest interest of the
United States in hearing the suit. Id.
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Not all courts, however, have followed this broad inter-
pretation of "forum" in their due process analyses. In a
sharp departure from Texas Trading, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California in Mead-
ows v. Dominican Republic99 declined to exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant foreign state because the latter had in-
sufficient contacts with the State of California.' Recog-
nizing that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
not ruled on the issue at that time, the Meadows court rea-
soned that, although the Second Circuit in Texas Trading
had applied a minimum contacts analysis based on any
contact with the entire United States, the Second Circuit
was merely applying the traditional "minimum contacts"
analysis with respect to the forum state because the de-
fendant in Texas Trading was sued in New York where it
did in fact conduct business.' 0 ' It may well be, however,
that the Meadows court's refusal to follow the Texas Trading
interpretation of traditional due process constraints upon
the exercise of jurisdiction was due to a reluctance to fol-
low automatically the Second Circuit before the Ninth
Circuit had spoken on the issue.' 0 2 The United States
98 Id. at 1108-09. The court explained its reasoning as follows in pertinent
part:
The court finds that to limit the forum to any particular state would
clearly not be in keeping with the intents and purposes of the FSIA.
Initially it should be noted that the plain language of the Act itself
refers again and again to contact with the United States, activity car-
ried on in the United States, activity elsewhere which causes a direct
effect in the United States. There is nothing whatsoever in the word-
ing of the Act to indicate that any one state, as opposed to the whole
country, should be utilized as the forum for the purpose of deter-
mining jurisdiction....
It is thus the finding of the Court that the relevant forum to be
utilized in determining whether jurisdiction exists is the entire
United States.
Id.
542 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Cal. 1982), appeal dismissed and remanded, 720 F.2d 684
(9th Cir. 1983).
1- Id. at 34.
10, Id.
102 See Id. at 34. This reluctance was expressed by the district court as follows:
The Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that it has not decided whether
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed an ap-
peal from this ruling without opinion. 10 3
Since the Meadows decision, however, the Ninth Circuit
has implicitly rejected Texas Trading by holding that in or-
der to satisfy due process requirements there must be
contacts by the foreign sovereign with the forum state." 4
In Olsen v. Government of Mexico, an aircraft owned by the
Mexican government had crashed in California. 0 5 The
court held that Mexico "purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of operating its aircraft over California" and that
the claims of the plaintiffs arose from the flight and crash
of the plane in California. 0 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit required contacts with the State of California in its
due process scrutiny. 10 7 Since the Meadows and Olsen deci-
sions, a Virginia district court has expressly rejected the
Texas Trading test in the context of determining personal
jurisdiction over a foreign airline. In Unidyne Corporation v.
Aerolineas Argentinas, 0 8  the court refused to exercise
juridiction over the airline because mere negotiations
with a Virginia plaintiff were insufficient to constitute the
purposeful activity required to satisfy the due process
analysis. Meadows, Olsen, and Unidyne may signify a trend
aggregation of national contacts is proper where federal jurisdiction
is asserted under a statute authorizing nationwide or world wide ser-
vice of process. Kramer Motors, Inc., v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628
F.2d 1175, 1177, n.4 (9th Cir. 1980). In the absence of clear author-
ity from the Ninth Circuit discarding the traditional minimum con-
tacts analysis where jurisdiction is asserted under the FSIA, we are
compelled to apply the traditional analysis to this case, and conclude
that there are insufficient contacts between the defendants and Cali-
fornia to warrant this Court's exercise of juridiction.
Id.
103 Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 720 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1983).
-o Olsen v. Gov't of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 648-51 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 295 (1985).
'o5 729 F.2d at 643-44.
lot 729 F.2d at 649. See also Wyle v. Bank Melli of Tehran, 577 F. Supp. 1148,
1159-60 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (foreign bank purposefully availed itself of benefit of
California law by relying on credit of a California bank).
107 Id. at 648-49.
1- No. 84-494-N (E.D. Va. Sept. 20, 1985).
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away from automatic application of the "national con-
tacts" due process test set forth in Texas Trading.
Under the broad interpretation of the FSIA in the Texas
Trading decision, a foreign air carrier qualifying as an in-
strumentality of a foreign state would be subject to suit in
every state of the United States even if it operated only
one flight a week into one state and did not maintain any
sales offices in any other state.'0 9 A domestic carrier, in
contrast, would normally be amenable to suit only in
those states where licensed to do business, where doing
business in the traditional sense, or where "minimum
contacts" sufficient to bring it within a state's long-arm
jurisdiction exist. Moreover, because a foreign air carrier
will be subject to the substantive laws of the forum state
rather than a uniform federal standard of liability, the
broad application of personal jurisiction under the Texas
Trading decision appears to contravene the basic constitu-
tional mandates of due process. As was stated by the
Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla,"10 it is "essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.""' Although an air carrier
may expect to be haled before a court in a jurisdiction
with which it has systematic and continuous contacts, 1 2
the function of the due process clause, as defined by the
Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 1 3 is to give "a degree of predictability to the legal
system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit."' "4
0- See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
1,o 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
"l Id. at 253.
112 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
-13 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
114 Id. at 297. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, - U.S.-,
104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984), the Supreme Court reversed a million-dollar jury verdict
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The potential injustice imposed by a broad application
of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA is even more sig-
nificant in the case of a foreign air carrier that cannot limit
its activities to certain areas of the United States by
choice, but is instead, at least with respect to flight opera-
tions, restricted by bilateral agreements as to the number
of cities in the United States to which it may operate. An
airline may, of course, operate sales offices throughout
the United States, in which case, some justification for a
finding of jurisdiction exists if the foreign carrier is li-
censed to do business in the forum. However, no such
distinction will be relevant if the Texas Trading analysis ul-
timately prevails.
Texas Trading relied upon cases brought under the se-
curities laws for authority to make a due process analysis
using national contacts rather than state contacts. 1 5 Un-
like actions based on securities laws, however, there ex-
ists no uniform federal standard governing the liability of
a foreign state in disputes arising out of contract or tort.
While the FSIA does set forth procedures for bringing
suit against a foreign state, substantive issues of liability
must still be determined under state law. If the Texas
Trading concept of "national contacts" is employed rather
than the traditional approach adopted by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Olsen" 6 and the Virginia court in Unidyne," 7 a for-
eign air carrier may be subject to the vagaries and
inconsistencies of the laws of various states, depending on
on the ground that the Texas court did not have in personam jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation in a cause of action unrelated to the corporation's activities in
Texas. Id. at 1869-70, 1874. The wrongful death actions arose out of the crash of
defendant's helicopter in Peru. The defendant's only contacts with the State of
Texas were contract negotiations in Texas; acceptance into its New York bank
account of checks drawn on a Texas bank; purchase of helicopters, equipment and
training services from a Texas manufacturer; and sending its personnel to the
Texas manufacturer's facilities for training. Id. at 1870-71. The Court reaffirmed
that "continuous and systematic contacts" between the defendant and the forum
state are required in order to assert general jurisdiction over a non-resident de-
fendant. See id. at 1872-74.
,,5 Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314.
"1 729 F.2d at 648.
117 Supra note 108.
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where the action is commenced, unless it succeeds in hav-
ing the action transferred to another district court on fo-
rum non conveniens grounds." 8
B. Removal
Under FSIA, United States district courts do not have
exclusive jurisdiction over actions against a foreign sover-
eign. 19 A plaintiff may, therefore, sue a foreign sovereign
state in an American state court, subject to the right of the
foreign sovereign to remove the case to federal court as a
matter of course, 20 without regard to diversity of citizen-
ship, existence of a federal question, or minimum amount
in controversy. 12' The foreign state must seek removal
within thirty days of service of process, summons, or ini-
tial pleading, 122 except for cause shown, 123 even though
section 1608(d) allows foreign sovereigns up to sixty days
,, The United States Supreme Court stated that the FSIA "does not appear to
affect the traditional doctrine of forum non conveniens." Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 490
n.15.
"9 See infra notes 120 and 131 and accompanying text. The advantage of re-
moval for a foreign airline is to obtain a non-jury trial so as to avoid the uncertain-
ties and local prejudices attendant upon jury trials. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), infra
note 120, which provides that cases removed to federal court pursuant to the
FSIA shall be tried by the court without a jury.
12o 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1982) provides for removal by a foreign state as
follows:
(d) Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the for-
eign state to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without jury.
Where removal is based upon this subsection, the time limitations of
section 1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged at any time for cause
shown.
121 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982) confers original jurisdiction on district courts and
states as follows in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard
to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for
relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not enti-
tled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or
under any applicable international agreement.
122 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982).
123 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (d) (1982). The time limitations of section 1446(b) "may be
enlarged at any time for cause shown." Id.
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to file an answer or responsive pleading.' 24 Once an ac-
tion against a foreign sovereign is removed from state to
federal court, it is tried without a jury. 125 In cases involv-
ing both sovereign and non-sovereign defendants, plain-
tiffs still enjoy the right to a jury trial of their claims
against non-sovereign defendants. 26
Section 1441(d)' 27 has been construed to permit re-
moval by a third-party defendant as well as by a defend-
ant.' 28  This right of foreign sovereign third-party
defendants to remove an action to federal court is limited,
however, to removal of the third-party action only, includ-
ing any cross-claims and counterclaims asserted between
a foreign state and a non-sovereign party. 129 Where the
foreign sovereign is a defendant as well as a third-party
plaintiff, there is some justification for removing the en-
tire action. 30 The legislative history of section 1441(d)
confirms that the section was intended to permit removal
"at the discretion of the foreign state, even if there are
multiple defendants and some of these defendants desire
not to remove the action or are citizens of the State in
which the action has been brought."'' 3'
124 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (d) (1982).
125 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (d), supra note 120.
12r Mori v. Port Authority, 100 F.R.D. 810, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
127 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(d), supra note 120.
128 In Alifieris v. American Airlines, 523 F. Supp. 1189, 1191-92 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) the court held that Olympic Airways, a third-party defendant in a civil ac-
tion filed in the New York Supreme Court, Kings County and a foreign state for
purposes of the FSIA, had a right to remove the third-party action to federal dis-
trict court pursuant to § 144 1(d). Because of concern over unduly extending fed-
eral judicial power at the expense of the state, the court severed the third-party
action and remanded the main action to state court. Id. at 1192-03. But see
Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980) where
the court held that removal by a foreign state defendant operates to remove the
entire action against all defendants. Arango did not involve a third-party action,
however.
12 41ifieris, 523 F. Supp. at 1191-92.
10 In Mori v. Port Authority, 100 F.R.D. 810, 812 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the
court permitted removal of the entire action and distinguished Alifieris on the
ground that the foreign sovereign defendant in Moi was a defendant and third-
party plaintiff, whereas in Alifieris, the foreign sovereign party was only a third-
party defendant.
'' H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 32.
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One of the objectives of the FSIA was to provide uni-
form treatment of foreign sovereigns. A foreign air car-
rier which qualifies as a foreign state under section
1603(b)(2) of the FSIA and which chooses to remove the
action may obtain a trial by the court even if the plaintiff
initially demands a jury in the state court, since section
1330(a), the FSIA grant of subject matter jurisdiction, is
the exclusive basis for federal jurisdiction in actions
against corporations owned by foreign states. 32 The
broad grant of jurisdiction made by section 1330 was in-
tended to promote uniformity of decisions where foreign
governments were involved.' 3 3 Other bases of jurisdic-
tion, such as diversity and federal question, are irrelevant
when the defendant qualifies as a foreign state. 3 4 Yet if
the foreign sovereign does not choose to remove the ac-
tion to federal court, the case will proceed in state court
and will be tried to a jury as in actions involving non-sov-
ereigns. t3 5  This discretionary right of removal may,
15 Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors, 761 F.2d 1527, 1532 (1 1th Cir. 1985);
Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1982); Hous-
ton v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir. 1982); Rex v. CIA.
Compania Pervana de Vapores, 660 F.2d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 102 S.Ct. 1971 (1982); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 881
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana
de Vapores, 639 F.2d 872, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1981). The circuits which have consid-
ered whether 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) is the sole basis for federal jurisdiction in a suit
against a foreign corporation owned by a foreign state have held that the Seventh
Amendment does not require a jury trial in such a case. Goar, 688 F.2d at 426-27;
Murmansk, 667 F.2d at 1154; Rex, 660 F.2d at 68-69; Williams, 653 F.2d at 881;
Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 878-81.
", H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 32.
134 In Ruggiero, the Second Circuit determined that jurisdiction in a suit against
a foreign state cannot be predicated on diversity of citizenship nor can the pres-
ence of a federal question provide an alternative basis for jurisdiction:
The courts must learn to accept that, in place of the familiar dichot-
omy of federal question and diversity jurisdiction, the Immunities
Act has created a tripartite division - federal question cases, diver-
sity cases and actions against foreign states. If a case falls within the
third division, there is to be no jury trial even if it might also come
within one of the other two.
Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 876.
'. The FSIA vests jurisdiction in the federal district courts and was intended to
provide a certainty that actions against a foreign state can be removed to the
United States district court. Section 1330 is silent as to the jurisdiction of state
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therefore, result in differing applications and interpreta-
tions of substantive law and in contradictory outcomes -
a result not intended by the drafters.1 36 Removal pursu-
courts but section 1605 provides that a "foreign state shall not be immune from
the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States" in the cases therein
described. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a), supra note 18. Subject to the right of the foreign
state to remove the action to federal court, state courts have the power to try
actions against foreign states to a jury. Verlinden, 46 U.S. at 489. In Martinelli v.
Djakarta Lloyd P.N., 106 Misc. 2d 429, 431 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Civ. Ct. Kings Cty.
1980), a New York state court chose to exercise its jurisdiction stating as follows:
Congress thus limited its policy to seek uniform, judge-made deci-
sions by leaving to foreign sovereign defendants in state courts the
option of removal to Federal Court or, in the alternative, to hazard
the relative uncertainties of state court trials, including those by jury.
Defendants' failure to exercise that option in no way impairs this
court's jurisdiction to enter judgment on the verdict.
106 Misc. 2d at 430-31, 431 N.Y S.2d at 749-50.
13 A reading of the congressional hearings indicates that the drafters of the
FSIA most likely intended to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, but
chose the alternative of removal rather than dismissal:
MR. DANIELSON. There is a procedure provided for removal in the
event action is commenced in a State court and there are a number
of exceptions, but, anyway, I am trying to envision how could an
action be commenced in a State court if the service or process is to
be done by a summons issued by the clerk of the Federal court?
How could that happen? How could the State court ever have juris-
diction that would require removal?
MR. RISTAU. We do have a somewhat anomalous situation at the
present time in this one respect. As you know, sir, foreign diplo-
matic personnel are suable only in the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court of the United States has original and exclusive juris-
diction in suits against foreign diplomats. A somewhat lower eche-
lon of foreign governmental functionaries in this country; namely,
consular officials of a foreign government can be sued only in the
U.S. district courts. Now, there have been repeated attempts to sub-
sume foreign sovereign governments to the jurisdiction of State
courts and, on occasion, by means of attachment, litigants have suc-
ceeded in bringing suits in State courts. You do have in the reported
cases quite a number of decisions from the courts of the State of
New York and other jurisdictions, where a foreign government be-
came a defendant in a State court.
MR. DANIELSON. What we are simply doing here would be to try
to provide a certainty that these can be removed at the request of the
foreign state to the U.S. district court?
MR. RISTAUS. Yes, sir, we feel that the question of the suability of
a foreign government in the courts of the United States is inextrica-
bly intertwined with one aspect of foreign relations. As a result of
this, we feel and we are convinced that the Congress has absolute
authority to legislate in this area.
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ant to section 1441(d) may also affect the substantive law
applied in the action.13 7
C. Service of Process
Section 1608 of the FSIA contains exclusive procedures
for effecting proper service of process upon an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state. 38  The Act provides
MR. DANIELSON. You have answered my question fully and I
thank you.
MR. BROWER. Excuse me, Congressman, but I thought your ques-
tion had a different thrust, namely, when this statute is in force and
an attachment is no longer available for establishing quasi in rem
jurisdiction and since this statute addresses itself, as far as service of
process is concerned, to the Federal courts but not to State courts,
how then, when this is on the books, will the defendant get jurisdic-
tion in the State courts and -
MR. DANIELSON. Oh, I think it would be idle act once this is a law,
assuming it becomes law, it would be an idle act to sue them in the
State courts, but at least the information that has just come forward
makes it clear that any pending actions which are being currently
filed, could be removed. But I think once it is law, there is no juris-
diction in the State court.
MR. BROWER. It is like the old question, where the client asked his
lawyer, can Smith sue me? Of course, he can sue you but whether he
can properly sue you or not is another question. It seems to me it
may be properly brought to the State court and I think the removing
procedure would apply only to actions which might be pending at
the time this act becomes effective. MR. MANN. As Mr. Brower indi-
cated, you could choose the alternative of removal rather than dis-
missal, in other words?
MR. BROWER. Right.
1973 Hearings, supra note 12, at 31 (testimony of Bruno Ristau, Chief, Foreign
Litigation Unit, Civil Division, Dept. ofJustice).
137 See infra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
1s 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b) (1982). The language of subsection 1608(b) is
mandatory and requires that service "shall be made" in the prescribed manner.
An interpretation of this language as providing exclusive means of service is sup-
ported by the expressed intent of Congress. "Section 1608 sets forth the exclusive
procedures with respect to service on. . . a foreign state or its political subdivi-
sions, agencies or instrumentalities." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 24.
(emphasis added). See also Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Came, 705 F.2d
250, 253 (7th Cir. 1983); Gray v. Permanent Mission of People's Republic of
Congo to the United Nations, 443 F. Supp. 816, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afd mem.,
580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978); Unidyne Corp. v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 18 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 17,817, 17, 819 (E.D. Va. 1984); Caribbean Southern Corp. v. Com-
monwealth of Dominica, 32 FED. R. SERV. 2d 1714 (N.D. Tex. 1981); 40 D 6262
Realty Corp. v. United Arab Emirates Gov't, 447 F. Supp 710, 711 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
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three methods by which proper service can be made. 139
Most foreign air carriers maintain an office close to their
operations within the United States, and personal service
can be effected on a managing agent as long as the re-
quirements of section 1608(b)(2) are met. 140
If service by a plaintiff is improper, he may serve the
defendant again so as to comply with the FSIA so long as
applicable statutes of limitation have not expired. In
practice, however, the defendant would most likely move
to dismiss the action on all available grounds, including
lack of proper service. Before permitting a plaintiff to
serve a defendant again so as to comply with section 1608,
the court will generally address all other grounds for dis-
missal to determine whether plaintiff may properly assert
a claim against the defendant.' 4' At the outset of litiga-
' o 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b). The FSIA provides that service upon an agency or in-
strumentality shall be made as follows:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accord-
ance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff
and the agency or instrumentalities; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint either to an officer, a managing or general
agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process in the United States; or in accordance with
an applicable international convention on service of judicial docu-
ments; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), and if
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, by delivery of a copy of
the summons and complaint, together with translation of each into
the official language of the foreign state-
(A) as directed by an authority of the foreign state or political
subdivision in response to a letter rogatory or request, or
(B) by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be ad-
dressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the agency or
instrumentality to be served, or
(C) as directed by order of the court consistent with the law of the
place where service is to be made.
Id.
40 See Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 821 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dis-
missed, 455 U.S. 929 (1982). The master of the vessel was deemed the agent of the
ship's owner for purposes of receivng process pursuant to section 1608(b)(2) even
though the summons and complaint were not sent to the foreign instrumentality
itself.
141 See Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Came, 705 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.
1983) ("It would be a waste ofjudicial resources to allow plaintiffs to go through
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tion, counsel representing a foreign sovereign defendant
should include, if applicable, improper service as grounds
for dismissal in any motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or improper
venue.
D. Venue
Despite the potential for inequitable assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction by some courts over foreign sovereign
defendants, there appears to be some relief for foreign
states provided by the venue provisions of the FSIA. Sec-
tion 1391 (f) 142 of FSIA defines the proper venue of an ac-
tion against a foreign state. Under section 1391(f), a
foreign air carrier qualifying as a foreign state may be
sued in any district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, 43
where the foreign air carrier is licensed to do business or
is doing business, 44 or in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. 45 Venue would be proper in
the district where the airline maintains offices, or, in an
action based on breach of a contract of carriage, where a
claimant purchased his ticket or boarded his flight.
If an action against a foreign state has been removed
from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), how-
ever, section 1441 (d) may determine the venue of the ac-
tion. There is some authority that removal pursuant to
section 1441 (d) precludes the defendant from challenging
the venue of the district court to which the action is re-
moved. 146 Section 1391(f) applies only to actions origi-
the motions of service if the suit will be later dismissed on some other ground.
Resolution of plaintiffs' request, then, must abide our review of defendants' re-
maining grounds for dismissal.")
142 28 U.S.C. § 1391(o (1982).
,43 28 U.S.C. § 1391(0(1).
,4 28 U.S.C. § 1391(0(3).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4).
146 If an action is removed pursuant to § 1441 (d), any subsequent transfer must
be pursuant to § 1404(a) because § 1391(o does not render venue improper in
the court to which the action is removed. Translinear, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti,
538 F. Supp. 141, 144 n.2 (D.D.C. 1982). See Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc.,
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nally "brought" in federal court. 147  In practice, this
provision means that if a foreign air carrier removes the
action as a matter of course without considering whether
venue is proper, it may be precluded from asserting at a
later date that venue is improper. 48  This would have a
significant impact on the procedural vehicle for transfer-
ring the action which, in turn, may affect the substantive
law to be applied by the transferee court. 149
Although section 1391 (f) specifies those factors gov-
erning proper venue, courts have utilized either section
1404(a) or section 1406 to effect a transfer to another
court.15 0 The transferee court's choice of law is governed
by which transfer statute the transferor court uses. If the
transferor court transfers for improper venue pursuant to
section 1406, the transferee court will apply the law of its
own forum.' 51 Conversely, cases transferred under sec-
345 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1953); Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v.
Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 317, 321-22 (D. Minn. 1980).
,47 Translinear, 538 F. Supp. at 144.
148 See id.
149 A recent decision interpreting section 1606 of the FSIA rejected application
of the forum's choice of law rules and instead applied the law of the place were the
act or omission occurred. In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March
14, 1980, MDL No. 441 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1985). Because Article 17 of the War-
saw Convention provides a presumption of carrier liability, the act of negligence
was the aircraft crash which occurred in Poland. Since Poland would apply a lex
loci delicti choice of law rule, the Court held that Polish law would apply to the
measure of damages recoverable in the wrongful death actions. If the foregoing
analysis is adopted by other courts, defense counsel in FSIA cases may remove or
transfer an action without affecting the substantive law to be applied.
-5 In Patel v. Kuwait Airways, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,262, 17,263-64 (D. Conn.
1983), where the defendant lacked any contacts with the forum state, the court
transferred the action pursuant to § 1404(a) even though venue was improper
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (f). Because venue had been improperly laid in Connecti-
cut, the transferor court should have transfered the action pursuant to § 1406(a)
to cure defective venue, instead of pursuant to § 1404(a) - a vehicle of transfer
for the convenience of parties and witnesses. Since the transferor court trans-
fered under § 1404, the transferee court may have to apply the law of Connecticut
even though the defendant had no contact with that state. See infra notes 151-152
and accompanying text. But see In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on
March 14, 1980, M.D.L. No. 441 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1985) (section 1606 of FSIA
requires application of choice of law rules of place where incident giving rise to
liability took place).
'5' Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 471-72 (6th Cir. 1980). This choice of law
rule operates to discourage forum shopping. See id.
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tion 1404(a) for the convenience of parties and witnesses
must be tried pursuant to the law of the transferor
court. 1
52
A foreign air carrier in an action brought in state court
should, therefore, consider very carefully the ramifica-
tions of removing the action to federal court under the
FSIA. When a foreign air carrier removes an action pur-
suant to section 1441 (d), it effectively affirms the venue of
the district to which the case is removed. 53 The foreign
air carrier may be precluded from asserting that the action
should be transferred pursuant to section 1406 for im-
proper venue.' 5 4 A subsequent transfer pursuant to sec-
tion 1404(a) to a more convenient forum would result in
application of the law of the transferor court, a result
which may not be advantageous to the foreign air carrier.
IV CONCLUSION
The FSIA seeks to provide a framework for resolving
disputes in which a foreign government is a party. In do-
152 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636-37 (1964). The Van Dusen court
noted that a section 1404(a) transfer for convenience would allow a "change of
law as a bonus for a change of venue" if the transferee court could apply the law
of the state where it sits. Id.
'" See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
In Translinear, the plaintiff originally filed the action in a Texas state district
court, then removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas. 538 F. Supp. at 143. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(f) and
1406(a), the federal court in Texas transferred the case to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia. Id. After transfer, defendant moved to
dismiss on the ground that the District of Columbia statute of limitations barred
the action. Id. Denying the defendant's motion, the court concluded that
§ 1391(f) applied only as a vehicle for transfer to actions originally "brought" in
federal court. Id. at 144. The court reasoned that after removal of a case to fed-
eral court under § 1441, a subsequent transfer should not be premised on im-
proper venue:
It would be a travesty of justice to permit defendant to successfully
juggle venue provisions of the United States Code to obtain a trans-
fer to this Court under section 1406(a) and then attempt to plead
the bar of the District of Columbia statute of limitations when the
case was timely filed in Texas.
Id. at 145. The court granted a motion by the plaintiff to transfer the case to the
Northern District of Texas, where many of the events of the case occurred. Id. By
so doing, Texas law would apply and the defendant would be prevented from
juggling venue provisions to obtain the benefit of more favorable laws. Id.
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mestic suits against foreign states acting in a commercial
capacity, careful consideration must be given to all aspects
of the FSIA. Because the Act is silent on some basic
points and its express provisions are often inconsistently
applied by the courts, counsel defending a foreign state
must resist the temptation to focus narrowly on isolated
provisions without gaining a thorough understanding of
the close interrelationship of all the provisions.
Since a court must determine jurisdictional issues at the
outset of each case, counsel should be familiar with all
leading decisions interpreting the FSIA in order to recog-
nize the fallacies in arguments raised by opposing counsel
on motions to dismiss. Both personal jurisdiction and
subject matter jurisdiction hinge on a finding that an ex-
ception to sovereign immunity exists. With regard to per-
sonal jurisdiction, recent decisions herald a general trend
against automatic adherence to the due process text based
on national contacts stated in dicta by the Texas Trading
court. Careful analysis of the Act suggests that this trend
requiring contacts with the forum state is based on sound
reasoning and is an interpretation which best effectuates
the overall purposes of the FSIA.
In cases subject to the Warsaw Convention, treaty sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in United States court pursuant to
Article 28 is a threshold determination unaffected by the
FSIA which relates solely to domestic jurisdiction. Satis-
faction of due process requirements ensures that foreign
states and their instrumentalities are not arbitrarily sub-
jected to the jurisdiction of every state of the union in the
absence of minimum contracts with the forum. Failure to
separate concepts of treaty jurisdiction under Warsaw,
subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, and personal
jurisdiction as limited by due process results in faulty
analysis by counsel, poor reasoning in court decisions and
bad law.
Comments

